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IF money talks, what does it say? Why do businesses contribute to political parties? Is money a universal language? Do business contri-
butions to political parties convey different messages in different coun-
tries? Since parties and firms are the key collective actors of capitalism 
and representative democracy,1 the answers to these questions are fun-
damental to our understanding of capitalist democracy and the variety 
therein. This article is a pioneering cross-national study of firm behav-
ior in political finance. Australia, Canada, and Germany were chosen 
as country cases because they have experienced turnovers under trans-
parent and permissive regulations of political finance. The main part 
of the article infers motivation by relating the strategies of 960 firms 
to variations in political competition in the three countries over peri-
ods of between seven and seventeen years. This quantitative analysis is 
supplemented by a qualitative investigation of the nature of exchanges 
between firms and parties.
The article aims to measure and explain variation in the pragmatic 
and ideological motivations for business contributions to political par-
ties. The pragmatic motivation seeks private goods from the political 
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system. In other words, pragmatic money is interested money. Another 
popular, but very different, explanation is that business contributions 
to parties are ideological. Ideological payments promote a public good. 
They express a preference for government based on a particular set of 
values and assumptions. Businesses often support a free-market ideol-
ogy but can also support other views of government and business, in-
cluding a developmental state. These very different motivations should 
have important consequences for politics and economies. Pragmatism’s 
effects on public policy should be disorganizing and distorting. In the 
language of American politics, the more important is the pragmatic 
business financing of politics, the more important is “corporate pork.” 
Pragmatism’s effect on political competition is conservative, in the 
sense that pragmatic firms will finance those in power and those likely 
to win power, disadvantaging newer or weaker competitors. Ideological 
payments are aimed at influencing political competition. They usually 
bolster right-wing parties and thus represent a different sort of con-
servatism than pragmatism. However, they should not have any direct 
effect on public policy and only influence it by acting as a right-wing 
bias in the political system more generally.
Does the relative importance of ideology and pragmatism vary ac-
cording to the political-economic context and, if so, why? In liberal 
market economies, the highly competitive, short-term focus of firms 
should generate substantial demand for private goods that could help 
firms develop advantages over their rivals. Pragmatism should be an 
important motivation for business financing of parties, and since prag-
matism is embedded in the basic profit-seeking mission of the firm, the 
contribution rate should be high. The preference for less state interven-
tion and the awareness of the state’s power to disrupt the business envi-
ronment is likely to engender a widespread awareness of the importance 
of public-policy goods to the overall business sector. This should result 
in a relatively important ideological motivation in business contribu-
tions to parties. However, this political effect should interact with the 
party system. In a polarized political system, the political risk should 
be greater. If there is little difference between parties’ economic policies 
and reputations, the political risk is low and the ideological motivation 
is likely to be marginal.
In a coordinated market economy, the most important policies for 
firms tend to be the public goods defined, championed, and, to a sub-
stantial extent, actually delivered by their business associations. In this 
context, the pragmatic motivation for contributions to political parties 
is likely to be very weak. The combination of consensual political insti-
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tutions and constrained parties means there is a very low risk of major 
policy change from election to election. So, there is also likely to be low 
interest in ideological financing of political parties. Since both motiva-
tions are undermined by the political economy, the contribution rate 
should be very low.
In Canada, until the ban on corporate donations in 2004, money 
tended to speak pragmatically. A large number of firms sought an un-
likely but potentially large benefit in exchange for a certain but small 
benefit to a party. In Germany, money tends to speak ideologically. A 
small number of companies grant a certain but small benefit to a party 
as an expression of a political preference. In Australia, pragmatism 
dominates, but there is also an ideological preference for the right. This 
mix of motivations is combined with a high contribution rate. These 
patterns are associated with fundamental differences in political econo-
mies and party systems. Pragmatic Canada and Australia are liberal 
market economies, while Germany is a coordinated market economy. 
Canada’s two traditional principal parties were almost ideologically in-
distinguishable, while Australia’s parties compete on a left-right basis.
The next section places this research in the context of the wider liter-
ature on business and politics. The dependent variable and independent 
variables are introduced in turn. A multinomial logit and associated 
simulations measure ideology and pragmatism in each country case. 
The penultimate section investigates discrete and reciprocal exchanges 
motivated by pragmatism. The conclusion summarizes and considers 
the wider significance of this three-country study.
firms, parties, and democracy
This article contributes to the abundant literature on the uneasy but 
vital relationship between capitalism and democracy.2 The tension be-
tween the currencies of the market and democracy, between money 
and votes, is an inherent one.3 The political influence of big business is 
generally divided into intentional and structural categories.4 A useful 
way of thinking about intentional business behavior is to distinguish 
between different actors.5 The firm can approach politics directly6 or 
4 world politics 
through intermediaries such as business associations7 or political con-
sultants.8 On the political side, there are huge differences between the 
bureaucracy, the executive, and the legislature. As a further complica-
tion, business may make contact with one type of political actor in order 
to influence a different one. For example, parties can influence the leg-
islature and the legislature can influence the executive. Pragmatic firms 
can pursue their interests with political parties through two principal 
channels—lobbying and cash contributions. These are often, but far 
from necessarily, related. There are other methods of relating to parties, 
such as charitable giving9 and various types of networking. These seem 
less important, and, of course, are also often, but not always, combined 
with lobbying or political finance. This article understands pragmatic 
business financing of parties as part of the lobbying process. The benefit 
of financial contributions for business is an increased likelihood of suc-
cessful lobbying.
While this research is easy to locate within the wider literature of 
business and politics, it does not fit easily into an existing research pro-
gram. Many of the above permutations of business and political actors 
have been intensely studied, but the literature on the relationship be-
tween firms and political parties is sparse. Beyond Wyn Grant’s discus-
sions of the “party state,”10 only a handful of systematic treatments are 
to be found.11 Thus, inspiration has to be somewhat indirect. There is a 
well-established literature on comparative political finance. However, it 
tends to tabulate sources of party income and expenditure in broad cat-
egories.12 There are a few interesting country studies based on firms.13 
Susan Scarrow draws some noteworthy comparative conclusions from 
the absolute and relative size of corporate and individual contributions 
to parties in Germany and the U.K., but her study does not focus on 
firm motivations14
The literature most relevant to this article is the voluminous research 
on business financing of politics in the U.S. Like the research presented 
here, it exploits firm-level data on payments to politicians. When com-
pared to the potential value of benefits, business spends very little on 
7 Schmitter and Streeck 1981; Bennett 1999; Greenwood and Jacek 2000.
8 Heinz, Laumann, Nelson, and Salisbury 1993.
9 Hansen and Mitchell 2000.
10 Grant, Martinelli, and Paterson 1989; Grant 1993, 13–18.
11 Hopkin 1997; Della Porta 2004.
12 Williams 2000; Nassmacher 2001; Scarrow 2007; Smilov and Toplak 2007.
13 Stanbury 1993, 291–318; Fisher 1994; Ramsay, Stapledon, and Vernon 2002; Bond 2007.
14 Scarrow 2006.
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political contributions.15 Surely, this reflects the costs politicians in-
cur by taking business money. Politicians must be seen to represent 
their constituencies in order to gain reelection. They cannot afford a 
perception that their political support can be bought. In a democracy, 
politicians need to emphasize that the currency of votes trumps that of 
money. Politicians have to manage their relationship with business sup-
porters in such a way as to minimize this cost. In terms of fundraising, 
politicians can try to raise money from nonbusiness sources, in particu-
lar, ordinary voters. To the extent that business funding in aggregate 
is important to them, they can reduce their reliance on any individual 
business by raising small amounts from a large number of firms.
In the U.S., business contributions are variously interpreted as more 
or less legal bribery,16 purchase of access to politicians,17 signals to bu-
reaucrats18 and legislators,19 mere gifts,20 and “interested gifts,” which 
generate an obligation to reciprocate.21 This last interpretation is the 
most convincing and has much in common with my emphasis on re-
ciprocal exchange between businesses and parties. It is consistent with 
a number of observations that are generally accepted in the American 
literature: contributions are small,22 they are distributed strategically,23 
and they are not routinely associated with policy benefits.24 Business 
contributions are a small investment with an uncertain and relatively 
low probability of a return at an uncertain point in time. Moreover, the 
size of the return is also uncertain, but is likely to be very large indeed.25 
So, this political investment is like a venture capital investment.
The U.S. literature provides a very useful discussion of possible 
costs and benefits of business financing of politics, but it is not framed 
comparatively. Indeed, the U.S. is a very awkward case from which 
to attempt to generalize. Its presidential system works very differently 
from the largely parliamentary regimes of other older democracies. Its 
elections and political finance are candidate-centered, unlike the party-
dominated systems of other countries. Finally, and perhaps most impor-
15 Tullock 1972; Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003, 108–9.
16 Drope and Hansen 2004.
17 Hall and Wayman 1990.
18 Gordon and Hafer 2005.
19 Hall and Deardorff 2006, 80.
20 Milyo 2002.
21 Clawson, Neustadtl, and Weller 1998; Gordon 2005.
22 Sorauf 1992, 187; Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003, 108–109.
23 Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003, 110; Stratmann 2005, 147–48; Krozner and 
Stratmann 2005.
24 Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003, 113–14.
25 Stigler 1971, 4–6; Clawson, Neustadtl, and Weller 1998, 68–71.
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tantly, there are major limits on the source, size, and purpose of business 
contributions in the U.S. The “bizarre and incongruous regulations”26 
pertaining to political finance in America mean it is actually very diffi-
cult to interpret the reported payments as indicators of the calculations 
of businesses. The next section introduces a conceptual framework that 
can capture and measure ideological and pragmatic motivations.
dependent Variable: ideology and pragmatism
The distribution of ideologically motivated donations should be rela-
tively stable over time because party ideologies change slowly. Even 
if parties tack to the left or the right for tactical reasons, it is rare for 
the left-right ranking of parties to change. In contrast, the distribu-
tion of pragmatic donations should follow short-term changes in the 
distribution of political power. These two motivations may interact in 
a single decision about the distribution of political contributions. For 
example, take a firm that has an ideological preference for the right. 
Under a left-wing government it may be prepared to contribute to the 
left while continuing to express its ideological preference by also fund-
ing the right-wing opposition. A firm’s distribution of cash to parties is 
a strategic decision that takes into account political power and, if it has 
one, its ideological position.
At any point in time, the distribution of a firm’s money can be to the 
left, to the right, a hedge between left and right, or not distributed at all 
(no contributions). If we consider two time points, shifts between the 
four basic distributions give us the sixteen cells in Table 1. Dividing the 
two time points by a change of government, we can identify some of 
the strategies as clear indicators of ideological (no color) and pragmatic 
motivations (black). In Table 1, a left-wing government has replaced a 
right-wing government. It can be inferred that firms that gave to the 
left in opposition as well as in government are ideologically committed 
to the left. Similarly, firms that continue to give to the right even after 
its ejection from government are committed to a right-wing ideology. 
Firms that shift from right to left as power shifts from right to left are 
classified as pragmatic. Those that hedge before and after the election 
have no ideological preference and are pursuing a pragmatic strategy. 
Other strategies suggest an interaction of ideological and pragmatic 
motivations (grey). The firms that did not contribute while the right 
26 Persily 2006, 219.
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was in power, but contribute to the left when it is in power, combine an 
ideological preference for the left with a pragmatic desire not to signal 
hostility to a right-wing government. Firms that hedge under the right 
but contribute exclusively to the left under a left-wing government, 
suggest a similar mix of pragmatism toward right-wing governments 
and a preference for the left. The same logic applies to those that con-
tribute to a right-wing government but abstain from political finance 
under the left and firms that plump for the right in government but 
hedge after a turnover. The other eight cells do not have implications 
for the underlying motivations of the firms.
Pragmatic firms finance parties in exchange for benefits from the po-
litical system. This can happen as a discrete or a reciprocal exchange. A 
discrete exchange is explicit and simultaneous. By contrast, in a recipro-
cal exchange, each actor’s part of the exchange is separately performed 
and the terms are unstated and uncertain.27 Reciprocal exchanges are 
likely to involve more and smaller payments. These two forms of prag-
matism are associated with different strategies. A firm that moves its 
money from right to left as power shifts from right to left is seeking a 
discrete exchange. A pragmatic firm that funds parties whether or not 
they are in government is betting on a reciprocal exchange. Firms that 
hedge consistently between government and opposition are likely to 
be seeking a reciprocal exchange from the opposition that may come 
to power in the future. A party that values a steady income stream and 
that values income when it is most needed, has good reason to recip-
rocate. Moreover, discrete exchanges should be associated with larger 
27 Molm 2000, 261–62.
table 1
classification of turnoVer strategies
Right in Power Left in Power 
 No Contribution Hedge Left Right
No Contribution   interaction  
Hedge  pragmatic interaction  
Left   ideological 
Right interaction  interaction pragmatic ideological
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payments than reciprocal exchanges. Reciprocal exchanges have lower 
potential publicity costs. Since the payment and policy benefit do not 
occur simultaneously, they are less likely to be associated with each 
other by those outside the exchange. Even if they are, the absence of 
simultaneity makes for plausible deniability. Also, the value of contribu-
tions associated with reciprocal exchange is an accumulation of past and 
expected future payments. Finally, of course, payments received by a 
party in opposition have a greater value, dollar for dollar, than payments 
received by a party in government.
It is possible to think of seemingly pragmatic rationales for the strat-
egy that has been coded ideological in Table 1. However, such rationales 
do not survive the clear-headed, politically aware, and business-focused 
cost-benefit analysis that defines the pragmatic firm. First, firms could 
donate to influence the outcome of an election. This is only conceiv-
able for a truly massive donation. Usually the probability of influencing 
an election, multiplied by the probability of the party delivering the 
benefit, is so low that cost is not justified as a profit-seeking invest-
ment. Second, a contribution to an opposition party should generate 
a much greater obligation on the part of the party and, therefore, a 
greater likelihood of a valuable reciprocal exchange if and when the 
party gains power. However, it is not pragmatic to ignore the party in 
power because of the hope that the currently powerless opposition will 
be grateful one day.
Third, it might be that the probability of receiving a benefit is much 
greater from one party than from another. However, parties rarely have 
strong opinions on narrowly targeted policies that produce private 
goods for one firm. Instead, they may have preferences in relation to 
broader business issues such as the corporate tax rate, the importance of 
manufacturing industry, and interest rates, among others. These prefer-
ences are reflected in policies that create public goods that are, of course, 
subject to collective action problems. Differences in broad policies areas 
are likely to reflect ideological differences between parties. Firms seek-
ing to support such policies will be ideologically motivated.
The fourth and final possibility is the most likely one. The closer an 
election, pragmatic firms should be less biased toward the government 
and more likely to hedge. A pragmatic firm, however, should not switch 
from government to opposition unless it appears very likely that there 
will soon be a turnover of power. This is essentially the same strategy as 
shifting from right to left, as power shifts from right to left.
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independent Variables: Varieties of capitalism
The varieties of capitalism approach to political economy stresses the 
“complementarity,”28 “elective affinity,”29 or “equilibrium”30 between a 
whole range of institutions at the political, legal, social, and economic 
levels.31 Peter Hall and David Soskice’s canonical presentation high-
lights institutions that affect the immediate environment of firms. Here 
I combine Hall and Soskice’s analysis of the firm with Torben Iver- 
sen’s32 and Stewart Wood’s33 emphasis on the political system’s ability 
to credibly commit. I then argue that these fundamental differences in 
political economy should result in very different levels of ideology and 
pragmatism in business financing of parties.
Australia and Canada are regarded as liberal market economies.34 
They exhibit each of the institutional complementarities that form the 
basis of the comparative advantage of liberal market economies. First, 
the stock exchange dominates the financial system. The value of do-
mestic publicly listed firms is over 100 percent of gross domestic prod-
uct (gdp), a value very similar to that of the U.S. Firms need to attend 
to their share price and current profitability. Second, in industrial rela-
tions, companies rely on the market to govern relations with their em-
ployees. Australian and Canadian levels of employment protection are 
relatively low and similar to each other, only separated by New Zealand 
in an eighteen-country study.35 This means firms have the flexibility 
to chase the short-term results that the stock market demands. Third, 
both countries emphasize generalist training and education, rather than 
industry-specific apprenticeships.36 Thus, workers can adapt to chang-
ing firm strategies and, more importantly, to a number of jobs over their 
careers. Fourth, in both countries contracts and competition tend to 
28 Hall and Soskice 2001, 17; Iversen 2005, 164.
29 Kitschelt, Lange, Marks, and Stephens 1999, 430.
30 Iversen 2005, 148.
31 Liberal and coordinated market economies are the two dominant types among the long-estab-
lished rich democracies. The varieties of capitalism approach has also been used to identify a dependent 
market economy in postcommunist Europe (see  Nölke and Vliegenthart 2009) and a rather differ-
ent type of coordination in East Asia (see Hall and Soskice 2001, 34–35). Some authors distinguish 
between two types of national and sector-coordinated economies in Western Europe (see Kitschelt, 
Lange, Marks, and Stephens 1999, 429–30). Italy is a mixed type displaying important characteristics 
of both the mixed and liberal types (Iversen 2005, 58; Soskice 1999, 112–15).
32 Iversen 2005, 122–82.
33 Wood 2001.
34 Bernard 2008; Kitschelt, Lange, Marks, and Stephens 1999, 435–36; Rueda and Pontusson 
2000, 365; Hall and Soskice 2001, 19–20, 59.
35 Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice 2001, 165.
36 Culpepper 2007, 618–21.
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define interfirm relations. Crucially, business associations play little or 
no role in the basic economic strategy of the firm. Instead, associations 
offer lobbying functions or sell marketing and public relations services 
that could be, and often are, also offered by other firms. Once again, this 
fits into the relatively short-term focus of the firm in a liberal economy. 
In Australia and Canada, business associations have tended to be weak, 
divided, and only intermittently effective in politics.37 Attempts to give 
such associations a substantial, institutionalized role in policy-making 
and implementation have failed at both national and, to a lesser extent, 
sectoral levels.38
Fifth, both countries have majoritarian political systems. Their exec-
utives are relatively unconstrained by the legislatures. Indeed, the prime 
minister dominates the cabinet.39 Majoritarian polities cannot credibly 
commit to providing the support and collaboration that a coordinated 
market economy requires. In this political context, it is to be expected 
that firms will have a more short-term focus, greater flexibility, and 
a greater potential for radical innovation. Firms tend to advocate less 
state intervention as this reduces the policy risk and most firms in liberal 
economies do not need the range of state-provided or state-supported 
institutions that are important in coordinated economies.
Sixth, Australia’s party system is relatively typical of a liberal market 
economy; it is based on a simple left-right divide.40 Australia’s center-
right is defined by a permanent coalition of the Liberal Party and the 
smaller National Party, which consistently wins rural seats in some ar-
eas. (These two parties are referred to as “the Coalition.”) Both have 
small memberships, ideological flexibility, and strong leadership. They 
compete with the Australian Labor Party (alp), which has strong links 
to trade unions; a large, relatively stable membership; and an endur-
ing conflict between more- and less-ideological factions. As in similar 
political economies, the center-right tends to be more successful.41 The 
majoritarian electoral system tends to give the right an advantage. The 
median voter is not attracted to long-term social insurance and means-
tested benefits for the poor.42 Australia’s more flexible center-right also 
has an advantage in targeting its electoral campaign at the shifting con-
cerns of the median voter.
37 Boatright 2009, 26–27.
38 Jacek 1986; Bell 1995; Bell 2006, 162; Haddow 2002.
39 O’Malley 2007, 17, 19–20; Savoie 1999.
40 Iversen 2005; Kitschelt, Lange, Marks, and Stephens 1999, 431, 434. McAllister 2002, 384.
41 Iversen 2005, 160. Sharman and Moon 2003, 268–69.
42 Iversen 2005, 124–26, 142.
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 In this respect, the Canadian party system is unusual. The two tra-
ditional competitors in the Canadian system—and the only two to have 
formed governments—are the Liberals and Progressive Conservatives 
(pc). Both were regarded as “brokerage” parties43 or franchise organiza-
tions44 and assembled relatively diverse electoral coalitions from across 
Canada. Before the earthquake election of 1993,45 the two had very 
similar profiles on economic matters, with the Progressive Conserva-
tives having a somewhat stricter reputation in relation to budgetary 
management.46 The membership of these two old Canadian parties 
tended to spike around general and party leadership elections. Indeed, 
many members seem to be loyal first and foremost to a parliamentary 
or leadership candidate.47 In Canada there is an even greater political 
bias against the left and toward short-term policy flexibility than in 
Australia.
The intensely competitive, short-term focus of firms in liberal market 
economies generates substantial demand for private goods that could 
help firms develop an advantage over their rivals. Pragmatism should 
be an important motivation for business financing of parties and, since 
pragmatism is embedded in the basic profit-seeking mission of the 
firm, the contribution rate should be high. The preference for less state 
intervention and the awareness of the state’s power to disrupt the busi-
ness environment generates a widespread awareness of the importance 
of public policy goods to the business community. This results in a rela-
tively important ideological motivation behind business contributions 
to parties. Canada’s unusually nonideological party system provides a 
special opportunity to separate out the effects liberal market economies 
have on ideological and pragmatic contributions to political parties.
Germany is the archetypical coordinated market economy48 and pro-
vides a contrast to liberal Australia and Canada in all six spheres. First, 
in the market for corporate governance, the stock exchange is comple-
mented by networks of firms and banks that provide other opportunities 
for finance.49 This allows firms to pursue long-term strategies that do 
not necessarily maximize short-term share price and profitability. Ger-
many’s domestically owned publicly listed firms are half as valuable as a 
percentage of gdp as their equivalents in Australia and Canada. Second, 
43 Carty 2002b, 726.
44 Carty 2002b, 730.
45 Cairns 1994.
46 Bélanger 2003, 544.
47 Carty 2002a, 356.
48 Hall and Soskice 2001, 21–27.
49 Vitols 2001, 342–43.
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employment security is very high and the institutionalized equalization 
of wages within sectors reduces incentives for workers to move from 
employer to employer. This encourages firms to commit to long-term 
specialization and incremental innovation. Third, training and educa-
tion is often highly specific to a particular company or industry. Of 
course, this system matches employees’ qualifications and incentives to 
the relatively long-term and niche strategies of firms. Fourth, interfirm 
relations exhibit both institutionalized and informal cooperation, as 
well the market relationships of competition and contract. Business as-
sociations are powerful organizations that tend to speak authoritatively 
for the interests they represent.50 Their importance depends on, and 
reflects, their indispensability to the basic strategies of member firms. 
Business associations often play a vital role by facilitating the diffusion 
of technology across firms and ensuring that the state plays an effec-
tive role in supporting and subsidizing research and training, sector by 
sector.51 Business associations set standards that are then granted legal 
status by the courts.52
Fifth, Germany’s executive is much more constrained than those of 
liberal market economies. These constraints include a powerful parlia-
ment with an upper house that can veto about sixty percent of legisla-
tion; the European Union, which establishes many of the regulatory 
and trade policies that are subject to intense lobbying in liberal mar-
ket economies; and the organized interests so vital to the success of 
a coordinated economy. This consensual system underpins the highly 
credible commitment of Germany to stable public policy that supports 
the long-term investment and cooperation needed for the incremental 
innovation in which coordinated market economies have comparative 
advantage.53
Sixth, Germany’s political parties have less ideological flexibility 
and a weaker right-wing bias than their counterparts in liberal mar-
ket economies. The German center-right is occupied by the Christian 
Democratic Union (cdu) and its rather more conservative Bavarian ally, 
the Christian Social Union (csu). The Christian Democratic leaders 
have not had authority and flexibility comparable to their equivalents 
in the Australian and Canadian center-right since Konrad Adenauer’s 
dominance of postwar Germany. The cdu finds it difficult to pursue 
right-wing policies as it genuinely straddles the center and has impor-
50 Streeck 1983.
51 Streeck 1992.
52 Casper 2001, 391.
53 Streeck 1992, 36.
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tant links to Christian labor unions.54 On the left is the Social Demo-
cratic Party (spd), with its roots in socialism and continuing strong 
links to labor unions. The ideological distance between the spd and the 
Christian Democrats was at its greatest in the 1950s.55 Since then the 
spd has managed—with varying levels of success—tensions between 
its left-wing and technocratic centrists.56 The 1990s saw the rise of 
the Alliance 90/the Greens and the Party of Democratic Socialism, 
heir to East Germany’s Socialist Unity Party. This meant the spd had 
serious competition on its left and reduced incentives to move to the 
center.57 German parties have relatively weak capacities and incentives 
to maneuver ideologically in pursuit of the median voter. Nevertheless, 
leaders’ dependence on left-wing or broadly consensual party structures 
means their parties can credibly commit to policies that support indi-
viduals’ and firms’ investment in highly specialized skills and markets.
In coordinated Germany, the most important policies for firms tend 
to be the public goods defined, championed, and, to a substantial ex-
tent, actually delivered by their business associations. In this context, 
the pragmatic motivation for contributions to political parties is likely 
to be very weak. The combination of consensual political institutions 
and constrained parties means there is a very low risk of major policy 
change from election to election. As a result, there is also likely to be 
low interest in ideological financing of political parties. Overall, contri-
butions to parties should be rare.
The varieties-of-capitalism approach seeks to explain cross-national 
differences. There are, of course, variations in behavior within national 
political economies, which an emphasis on national institutional frame-
works, however anchored in the logic of the individual firm, cannot 
explain. The dominant approach to explaining firm behavior has been 
to focus on economic characteristics—chiefly size and business sector.58 
Crucially, different sectors have different exposure to politics59 and dif-
ferent incentives to finance political parties. In addition, there are con-
vincing arguments that the internal organization of a firm, such as the 
presence of a government-relations division or the importance of the 
human resources department, can influence its political behavior.60
54 Wood 2001, 254, 271.
55 Pulzer 1995, 70; Smith 1982, 98–101.
56 Pulzer 1995, 125, 137. Padgett 2003.
57 Kitschelt 1999, 329.
58 Martin 2006, 53–56.
59 Stigler 1971.
60 Martin 2000; Martin 2005; Martin 2006, 56-62.
14 world politics 
cases and samples
The criteria for selecting country cases were the transparency and per-
missiveness of the political finance regime and the existence of a govern-
ment turnover. As in the U.S., Australia, Canada, and Germany enforce 
relatively high levels of transparency. The three countries’ similarly low 
levels of corruption suggest that disclosure variations have not system-
atically biased conclusions about the differences between the cases.61 
The limit above which disclosure was required varied. In Canada it 
was only C$100; in Australia, A$1,500; and in Germany, €10,000. The 
Australian system reports all payments to political parties, whether they 
are donations or not. In practice, many, and probably most, political 
contributions are reported as “other payments.” In contrast to the U.S., 
none of these countries limits the amounts businesses can give. There 
were also no restrictions on how contributions could be used. The only 
significant restriction on source was a ban on foreign donations. Thus, 
reported payments represent a relatively pure indicator of the political 
calculations of businesses rather than flows of money that have been 
warped and constrained by a regulatory system. Australia, Canada, and 
Germany seem to be the only three cases currently existing that com-
bine transparency, permissiveness, and turnover to provide vital intrac-
ase variation in political circumstances.
 Samples have been drawn from published lists of the largest firms 
in each country. Practical considerations resulted in differences in the 
length of the lists and periods used to define the three samples. None-
theless, the country samples represent essentially comparable groups of 
consistently very large firms that have less than 50 percent state owner-
ship. The research design avoids the potential sample-selection bias62 
that is sometimes evident in the study of the distribution of contribu-
tions.63 The Australian data set exploits the essentially uniform political 
finance regulations and party systems at the federal level and within its 
six states, while the Canadian and German studies are restricted to the 
federal level. There is at least one clear turnover in each sample. Table 
2 presents basic information about the samples.64
These quantitative sources are supplemented by a qualitative study 
that explores the relative importance of discrete and reciprocal exchanges 
in party-firm relations. The qualitative data were mostly obtained from 
61 Available at http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009 
_table.
62 Munger 1988; Kim 2008.
63 Fisher 1994; Burris 2001.
64 The data is available at http://webpages.dcu.ie/~mcmenami.
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key-word searches in the LexisNexis database. This generated a corpus 
of articles: 475 documents and 202,000 words for Australia, 641 docu-
ments and 365,000 words for Canada, and 320 documents and 303,000 
words for Germany. Given the cost of visible exchanges to firms and 
politicians, it is difficult to obtain more direct evidence. Many of the 
newspaper accounts focus on this article’s research question; they seek 
to identify the benefit gained by businesses that contribute to political 
parties. The qualitative interpretations are consistent with the rigor-
ously collected and analyzed quantitative data. The next section pres-
ents an analysis of the statistical data.
data analysis
The dependent variable is calculated from the official reports for each 
country. The Australian figures incorporate payments to “associated 
entities,” as well as direct payments to parties. “Donations” as well as 
“other payments” are included. To begin the study of firm strategy, a 
measure of bias has been calculated and is defined as payments to the 
major left-of-center party as a proportion of payments to the two main 
parties (or electoral coalitions). For Australia, bias is a firm’s payments 
to the Australian Labor Party over its payments to the Australian Labor 
Party, the Liberal Party and its permanent ally, the National Party. For 
Canada, bias is payments to the Liberals over payments to the Liberals 
table 2
characteristics of samplesª
 Firms Years Jurisdictions Observations Elections Turnovers
Australia 450   7 (1999–2005) 7 22,050 14 1
Canada 195 17 (1984–2000) 1   3,315   4 2
Germany 315 14 (1992–2005) 1   4,410   3 1
        ª Firms with over 50 percent direct state ownership have been excluded. The Australian 
sample is defined by membership in the Business Review Weekly Top 1,000 in 1999 and 2005. 
The starting date is set by the availability of electronic records, and the end date is set by a major 
regulatory change that moved the threshold for reporting from A$1,500 to A$10,000 per annum. 
The Canadian sample is defined by membership in the Globe and Mail Report on Business Top 
1,000 in 1983 and 1998 (available at http://www.lib.uwo.ca). The Canadian start date is due to the 
time-consuming nature of data entry; the end date marks a break in the continuity of records. The 
German sample is defined by membership in the Die Welt Top 500 in 1997 and 2002 (available at 
http://top500.welt.de). Nineteen ninety-two is the beginning of the German sample because of a 
large reduction in the threshold for reporting introduced that year and 1997 is the earliest year for 
which the Die Welt list is available.  Two thousand five is the last year for which data is available. The 
formation of a grand coalition in Germany in 2005 is not counted as turnover.
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and the Progressive Conservatives. In Germany, it is contributions to 
the Social Democratic Party over donations to the Social Democratic 
Party and the Christian Democratic Union and its permanent ally, the 
Christian Social Union. As shown in Figures 1–3, the distribution of 
payments across the three samples is very different. In Australia, most 
firms plump for both the left and right, with a much smaller proportion 
opting to hedge. However, in Canada, almost as many hedge as opt for 
either the Liberals or the Progressive Conservatives. In Germany, the 
vast majority of firms made contributions to the cdu-csu exclusively, 
with only a handful choosing the spd. Firms clearly cluster around the 
strategies introduced in the theoretical framework: no contribution, a 
clear preference for one party, or hedging. More subtle distributions are 
rare. Thus, the dependent variable for multivariate analysis consists of 
four categories: no contribution; left (bias ≥ 0.67); hedge (bias between 
0.34 and 0.66); and right (bias ≤0.33).
The following variables are used to explain variation in the firms’ 
contribution strategies. First, there is a dummy variable for left govern-
ment. Next is years, which counts the number of years until the next 
figure 1 
distribution of bias in australiaa
a Obs. = 2,162; 239 firms. Bias is the reported contributions to the Australian Labor Party (alp) 
over payments to the alp and the Liberal–National coalition in a given jurisdiction in a given year. 
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constitutionally mandated election. Poll uses monthly opinion polls 
to compute the probability of the left-wing party winning more votes 
than its right-wing competitor in the event of an immediate election.65 
There are also interactions of left and poll with the number of years to 
the next election. Then there is a firm’s income (logged to reduce the im-
pact of outliers).66 Larger firms are more likely to hedge because of the 
lower costs of payments relative to their income. Finally, the firms have 
been classified into seven sectors based on amalgamations of the UN 
International Standard Industrial Classification because of collinearity 
problems in more disaggregated versions.
The models reported in Table 3 are multinomial logits. The sepa-
rate equations predict the logged odds of each of the contribution cat-
65 Australia: Roy Morgan Poll, two-party preferred voting intentions, except for Tasmania’s Single-
Transferrable Vote system where I have used first preferences. Canada: Gallup Poll. Germany: Politba-
rometer, weighted by the populations of the former East and West Germany.
66 Australian incomes interpolated for 2000, 2001, 2003, and 2004. Canadian income figures im-
puted from data for 1983, 1987, 1994, and 1998 using Amelia II (see King, Honaker, Joseph, and 
Scheve 2001). German incomes imputed from data for 1997, 1998, 1999, 2002, and 2005, excluding 
banks and insurers for which no income figures are available.
figure 2 
distribution of bias in canadaa
a Obs. = 1,696; 167 firms. Bias is the reported contributions paid to the Liberal Party over 
payments to the Liberal Party and Progressive Conservative Party (pc) in a given year.
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egories by reference to no contribution. The Australian and Canadian 
models conform to the framework introduced above. For the German 
sample, it was necessary to collapse the hedge and left-wing categories. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm to account for heteroskedasticity. 
There is no such neat solution to deal with potential time dependence 
in multinomial logits, and likelihood-ratio tests showed the necessity 
of including year dummies67 in the Australian and Canadian equations 
(see models 4 and 5). The poll variable was severely collinear with left 
in the Canadian case and did not pass a likelihood-ratio test for Ger-
many, but is featured in model 6 for Australia. Likelihood-ratio tests 
also suggested the inclusion of interactions of left with the electoral 
67 Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998 prefer using cubic splines rather than year dummies, but there was 
insufficient variation in the data sets to compute the cubic splines. In both the Australian and Cana-
dian cases, the reference year was the first one of the sample. There were some collinearity problems in 
the Canadian sample that were alleviated by the additional omission of the last year.
figure 3 
distribution of bias in germany a
a Obs. = 191; 59 firms. Bias is the reported contributions to the Social Democratic Party (spd) 
over payments to the spd and Christian Democratic Union-Christian Social Union coalition in a 
given year.
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table 3
multinomial logit estimates of firm strategy
Model 1
Australia
Model 2
Canada
Model 3
Germany
Model 4
Australia 
Model 5
Canada 
Model 6
Australia 
Hedge Hedge Hedge Hedge Hedge
Left 0.15
[0.118]
–0.597
[.0.15]***
–1.045
[0.27]***
–2.087
[0.39]***   
–1.187
[0.36]***
Years –0.36
[0.061]***
–0.277
[0.031]***
–0.9
[0.15]***
–0.326
[0.06]***   
–0.13
[0.69]
Left*Years 0.62
[0.14]***
0.252
[0.092]*** 
0.739
[0.2]***
Poll 1.163
[1.54]
Poll*Years –0.9
[0.82]
Constant –2.784
[0.681]***
–11.473
[1.27]***
–2.14
[0.64]***
–11.2
[1.28]***
–3.19
[1.68]*
Right Right Right Right Right Right
Left –0.473
[0.08]***
–1.196
[0.147]***
–0.21
[0.175]
–0.973
[0.155]***
–3.72
[0.8]***    
–0.6
[0.248]**
Years –0.09
[0.03]***
–0.214
[0.034]***
–0.108
[0.066]
–0.25
[0.058]***
–0.17
[0.06]***
0.445
[0.315]
Left*Years 0.2
[0.063]***
0.46
[0.18]**
0.256
[0.116]**
Poll –0.657
[0.77]
Poll*Years –0.776
[0.396]*
Constant –2.52
[0.275]***
–4.619
[0.874]***
–4.939
[0.604]***
–2.11
[0.31]***
–4.86
[0.9]***
–2.06
[0.685]***
Left Left Hedge/Left Left Left Left
Left 0.146
[0.113]
0.849
[0.162]***
0.684
[0.33]**
–0.82
[0.223]***
0.385
[0.39]
–1.53
[0.282]***
Years –0.163
[0.029]***
–0.066
[0.0278]**
–0.215
[0.128]*
–0.6
[0.09]***
–0.242
[0.1]**
1.43
[0.52]***
Left*Years 0.458
[0.1]***
0.19
[0.115]*
0.725
[0.127]***
Poll 6.22
[1.52]***
Poll*Years –2.32
[0.58]***
Constant –3.056
[0.241]***
–6.873
[0.858]***
–8.14
[1.272]***
–2.555
[0.325]***
–6.47
[0.88]***
–8.05
[1.4]***
Year dummies no no no yes yes yes
Observations 22,050 3,315 4,410 22,050 3,315 22,050
Robust standard errors, clustered by firm, in brackets.  *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * 
significant at 10%. Income and sectoral controls included in all equations.
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timetable in models 4, 5 and 6, and poll with the electoral timetable 
in model 6. The resulting equations are highly complex. For example, 
there are three twenty-five variable equations in model 5. Moreover, 
the year dummies, years variable, left variable, poll variable, and their 
interactions are all potentially collinear as they track changes in political 
context from year to year. Unfortunately, this also makes for presenta-
tional problems that I confront by presenting several models. The first 
three relatively straightforward models ensure maximum comparability 
across all country cases. The next two combine statistical accuracy and 
comparability of Canada and Australia, while the final, Australia-only 
model uses the maximum amount of information to probe into ideo-
logical and pragmatic strategies. The nature of multinomial logit coef-
ficients makes their substantive implications difficult to discern and this 
is, of course, a greater problem with lots of variables and interactions. 
However, the models can be used to produce predictions in the form of 
the sixteen-cell table of strategies presented in Table 1. Each simula-
tion is derived from the most complex model for each country.68 The 
rank order of predicted strategies is almost identical for the basic and 
complex models.69
Left and/or its interaction with years significantly increase the prob-
ability of contribution to the left and decrease the probability of contri-
bution to the right in all models of Table 3, except for right-wing con-
tributions in Germany. In the context of highly complex equations and 
potential collinearity, the power and consistency of the basic political 
variables is very impressive.70 Tables 4, 5, and 6 use the coefficients from 
68 For Canada and Germany all variables remain at sample values, except for left and its interaction. 
For model 3, poll is set at 0.5 and its interaction is appropriately modified.
69 In Table 3, model 1, the alp-alp strategy is fifth instead of sixth and the coalition-hedge strategy 
is sixth instead of fifth.
70 These conclusions were subjected to a number of robustness tests. The Australian data undoubt-
edly contains some payments, which are part of the day-to-day running of the party, rather than politi-
cal contributions. A business relationship is more likely in the business services, finance, and insurance 
sectors. Excluding the 22 percent of firms in these categories also made no substantive difference to 
model 3. The predicted rank order of the strategies is the same as reported in Table 5 above. Also, the 
Australian data set contains contributions reported in seven different jurisdictions. I ran model 3 with 
a variable measuring gross state product for the states and gross domestic product for the Common-
wealth. This method provides a good indicator of the relative economic importance of the states, but 
overestimates the Commonwealth’s importance. Indeed, the New South Wales and Victorian contri-
bution rates were higher than the federal level. I ran another version with the Commonwealth value 
held at the maximum state level (New South Wales). These two versions produced the same order of 
strategies, slightly different from model 3 with coalition-hedge and coalition-alp swapping fourth and 
fifth places and hedge-hedge and alp-alp swapping sixth and eighth places. This suggests a margin-
ally stronger ideological motivation. The German firms had larger incomes than their counterparts 
in Canada and Australia. If the German threshold is calculated as a proportion of the mean income 
in the sample, it is barely higher than the Australian and Canadian thresholds. Given that pragmatic 
firms should undertake a cost-benefit analysis of contributions, this seems like a reasonable approach 
to assessing differences in thresholds. A more obvious, but less theoretically appealing, alternative is 
to apply the German threshold on the basis of purchase-power parity. This reduces the contribution 
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table 5
predicted turnoVer strategies: australia
Right in Power Left in Power 
 Noncontribution Hedge Left Right
Noncontribution 0.086   0.097
Hedge  0.0015  0.0021
Left   0.0024 
Right 0.281  0.009 0.12 0.036
table 4
predicted turnoVer strategies: canada
Right in Power Left in Power 
 Noncontribution Hedge Left Right
Noncontribution 0.22   0.12
Hedge  0.029  0.067
Left   0.02 
Right 0.15  0.035 0.08 0.015
table 6
predicted turnoVer strategies: germany
Right in Power Left in Power 
   Noncontribution Hedge/Left Right
Noncontribution 0.915 0.0114
Hedge/ Left    0.00007
Right   0.0363  0.0005 0.0012
rates for Canada and Australia, but they are still three times that of Germany. Finally, the Canadian 
and German party systems are more complex than Australia’s. To the left of the Social Democrats in 
Germany are the Greens. However, they have reported only occasional business donations. Thus, there 
is no overestimation of ideological bias because of their exclusion. To the right (on business matters, at 
least) of the Christian Democrats and Christian Socials are the Free Democrats, who do attract busi-
ness donations. Thus, the bias to the right may be even greater than that reported above. In Canada, 
the New Democrats to the left of the Liberals have never attracted serious numbers of business dona-
tions. After 1993, the Progressive Conservatives lost much of their parliamentary representation to the 
upstart right-wing Reform Party. However, the reformers did not attract enough business funding to 
seriously modify the results reported here (see Curtis 1999; Elections Canada 1997, 2000).
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Table 3 to predict the probabilities of different strategies as government 
turns over from right to left.
The predictions for Canada (Table 4) illustrate the dominance of 
pragmatism. Over three-quarters of firms are expected to make a pay-
ment to one of the big parties over a two-parliament period. The pure 
ideological strategies are less popular than all pure pragmatic or inter-
active strategies. The interactive strategies do not exhibit a bias toward 
the left or the right. The sums of the interactive categories that lean to-
ward the left or the right are almost exactly equal. The models predict a 
massive advantage for the government. If the Progressive Conservatives 
are in power there should be 3.78 times as many pc-only contributors 
as Liberal-only contributors. If the Liberals form the government, the 
equations predict 5.3 times as many Liberal-only contributors as pc-
only contributors. Canadian firms react decisively and dispassionately 
to changes of power. Canadian business money speaks the language of 
pragmatism.
The Australian simulation (Table 5) illustrates a combination of 
pragmatic and ideological motivations. As in Canada, the contribution 
rate suggests that financing political parties is a normal part of busi-
ness.71 However, the ranking of strategies between the two countries is 
very different. In Australia, the most likely reaction to a turnover from 
right to left is to pay to the right when in government but refuse to fund 
either party under the left. This is almost three times as likely as its 
left-leaning equivalent. The same goes for plumping for the right while 
it controls the government and hedging when the left comes to power; 
the probability of this is four times larger than the opposite pro-left 
strategy. Ideological purity is not, as it is in Canada, the rarest strategy. 
Cleaving to the right whether it is in government or opposition is the 
third most likely strategy; it is fifteen times more likely than sticking 
with the left. These strategies result in more subtle financial ramifica-
tions for governing parties and opposition parties.
The simulation predicts almost no change in the number of coali-
tion-only donors after a governmental turnover; it should stay stable 
at about 10 percent. When the alp controls the executive, however, 
the percentage of alp-only contributors increases by 75 percent: from 
2.1 percent to 3.6 percent. The inclusion of poll figures allows an even 
more vivid portrayal of how ideological bias and pragmatism interact in 
71 The predicted Australian contribution rate is to any of the seven jurisdictions, while the Canadian 
equivalent is to the federal level only. Thus, the Canadian contribution rate is higher than Australia’s. 
The German and Australian rates compare more straightforwardly as the German figures amalgamate 
and do not distinguish between contributions to the federal and state branches of parties.
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Australian political finance. In an election year, if the Coalition is in op-
position with only a 10 percent chance of winning the election, almost 
4.5 percent of firms will continue to give only to the Coalition. If the 
Coalition’s prospects reverse and polls give them a 90 percent chance 
of victory, the number of contributors to the Coalition is predicted to 
rise to 12.6 percent. If the Australian Labor Party finds itself in opposi-
tion with a one-in-ten chance of government in an election year, only a 
miserable 0.25 percent of firms will give to them alone. However, if the 
alp seems almost certain to win with a 90 percent probability, the num-
ber of alp-only contributors increases by a factor of twenty-four to 6.3 
percent. This example suggests that Coalition-only contributors com-
bine pragmatic and ideological motivations, but alp-only contributors 
are almost entirely pragmatic. Australian businesses react to changes 
in government and likely changes in government, but they are clearly 
biased toward the coalition of the Liberal and National Parties. None-
theless, if the Australian Labor Party is in power, Australian businesses 
will be prepared to fund it, or at least desist from funding its competitor. 
In Australia business money is bilingual: it speaks the languages of both 
pragmatism and ideology.
The initial contrast between Germany (Table 6) and the other two 
cases is stark. The vast majority of German companies do not involve 
themselves in party finance. The ideological category of consistent pay-
ments to the right is larger than any of the categories that could be 
interpreted as indicators of neutrality or left-wing bias. The highest 
probability relates to firms that contribute to the right under a right-
wing government and do not contribute at all under the left. While 
this is reminiscent of the behavior of Australian firms, it is important 
to remember that it is on much smaller scale. These ideological contri-
butions reflect the Christian Democrats’ enduring “anti-left” identity72 
and perhaps also a tradition established when ideological competition 
was much sharper and the risk of a major change in the business en-
vironment was imaginable.73 A small number of German firms speak 
the language of ideology, but pragmatism can motivate them to refrain 
from expressing their preference for the right.
In addition to changes in the (expected) distribution of political 
power, the electoral schedule also has an implication for pragmatic 
firms. In Australia and Canada, the closeness of an election has a much 
larger effect on the hedging category than the other two contribution 
72 Pridham 1977, 305; Pulzer 1995, 137; Smith 1982, 198, 202; Wood 2001, 266.
73 Wiegrefe 2001; Lersch and Palmer 1999.
24 world politics 
patterns. In other words, firms react rationally to increasing political 
uncertainty. Larger firms are more likely to adopt each of the contri-
bution strategies in all equations. Moreover, as predicted, income is 
most strongly associated with hedging. By contrast, sectoral dummies 
are only intermittently influential. Firms from all sectors influence the 
choice of left or right in Australia and manufacturing firms are more 
likely to hedge. In Germany, financial firms are more likely to contrib-
ute to the right and the primary sector is more likely to hedge or give 
to the left. In Canada, the only significant result is that financial firms 
are more likely to hedge.
A varieties-of-capitalism account fits the contrast between liberal 
Australia and Canada and coordinated Germany. In the liberal market 
economies, most firms contribute to political parties because there is a 
pragmatic business case for doing so. In these systems, both major par-
ties attract large numbers of contributions and are more likely to do so 
when in power. However, in coordinated economies such as Germany, 
firms rarely contribute to parties but when they do so they almost al-
ways give to the right. Nonetheless, there are major differences between 
Australia and Canada. Australian business expressed an ideological 
preference for the right, while in Canada big business did not favor 
either party. The party system is the obvious explanation for this differ-
ence. Australian parties compete on a left-right basis while Canadian 
parties exhibited little ideological polarization. This interpretation can 
be bolstered by intracase variation.
The Australian Labor Party’s dash toward the market in the 1980s 
and 1990s represented a tremendous change in the ideological envi-
ronment of Australian politics. The alp introduced a disclosure law 
in 1984 and substantially strengthened it in 1992.74 However, this era 
did not result in a withdrawal of business from financing parties, but 
rather a shift from ideological to pragmatic motivations. The alp used 
disclosures to target traditional Liberal donors.75 The alp’s new atti-
tude toward business reached its most extreme in Western Australia, 
which was rocked by spectacular scandals in the late 1980s.76 In other 
jurisdictions, the alp developed a system to encourage pragmatic do-
nations by offering a range of access and relationship-building events 
and memberships. The Liberals could no longer take business support 
for granted and had to respond in kind by also facilitating pragmatic 
contributions. The narrowing of ideological competition in Australian 
74 Chaples 1994, 31.
75 Gordon and Ceresa 1995.
76 Wainwright 1992; Cohen 2007.
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politics seems to have lead to a reduction in the bias toward the right 
of business financing of political parties and to a related increase in 
pragmatism.
These conclusions dovetail with other differences in business politi-
cal behavior between coordinated Germany and liberal Australian and 
Canada. Associations continue to dominate lobbying in Germany.77 In-
deed, as late as 2002, a practitioner reported that there was virtually no 
market for public affairs expertise in Germany.78 In contrast, lobbying 
by individual firms has been an important, and generally legitimate, 
part of politics in Australia and Canada since the Second World War.79 
This lobbying is carried out by the public affairs units and senior man-
agement of large firms as well as by specialized consultants and law 
firms.80
discrete and reciprocal exchanges
Pragmatism was the dominant motivation for business financing of 
parties in Canada and was an important motivation in Australia. In 
both countries, these payments were part of discrete and reciprocal ex-
changes. The idea of a discrete exchange tended to dominate journalis-
tic thinking and media reporting on business financing of parties. The 
most obvious type of discrete exchange is bribery. Both of these rela-
tively uncorrupt countries have had political finance scandals,81 a subset 
of which involved alleged or proven corruption. However, it is virtually 
universally assumed that such episodes were aberrations. In spite of 
their obvious news value, articles on corruption are relatively rare com-
pared to articles with headlines about access for sale—also constructed 
as a discrete exchange by the media. These almost became a genre in 
the Australian and Canadian press and reported a range of secret and 
public fundraising events.
In Canada, fundraising events with ministers or members of parlia-
ment (mps) could be relatively small gatherings, but annual dinners with 
party leaders often attracted thousands. While tickets to these events 
were available to individuals, businesses dominated by buying up whole 
tables for several thousands of dollars.82 Usually, the large dinners were 
preceded or succeeded by smaller receptions for bigger or more regular 
77 Ronit and Schneider 1998. Schneider 2006, 115–19.
78 Behrens 2002, 175.
79 Schneider 2006, 115.
80 Rush 1998, 516–19; Warhurst 1998, 539–43.
81 Cohen 2007; MacDermid 2000; Tretbar 2010.
82 Clark and Mackie 2003.
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contributors.83 Smaller events could provide much more intimate ac-
cess and were priced accordingly: a foursome on a golf outing with 
the Liberal Finance Minister Paul Martin cost C$10,000; dinner with 
Prime Minister Chrétien was sold at the same price, even though on 
at least one occasion the special guest star failed to appear.84 Dinners 
and other events were often held in secret even if associated donations 
were disclosed.85 Throughout the 1980s, the Liberals and Progressive 
Conservatives held special events for the members of the Laurier Club 
and the 500 Club, respectively. Membership in these clubs was available 
to those contributing over a set, relatively low, amount. In 2003, $1,000 
was needed to qualify for the both clubs. Australian fundraising has 
relied on a remarkably similar mix of events.
Much of this fundraising is more coherently interpreted as a process 
of reciprocal rather than discrete exchange. It would have been impos-
sible to provide real access to decision makers for the huge numbers of 
Canadian and Australian businesses that made financial contributions 
to parties. Both countries have Westminster regimes where power is 
very tightly focused on the cabinet and prime minister. Moreover, a 
direct exchange of cash for influence, or even potential influence, can 
be very costly for democratic parties. The access-for-sale interpretation 
of these exchanges does not easily fit with the rhetoric surrounding 
fundraising from business that emphasized ideological and social moti-
vations for making contributions and attending functions. The problem 
lies in thinking of money and access as a discrete exchange; they are 
not.
 Money and access were both parts of a symbiotic system of lobby-
ing and political finance in which businesses and politicians developed 
mutually beneficial relationships over a period of time. These relation-
ships developed and justified themselves to profit-seeking businesses 
and cash-hungry parties through reciprocal exchange. For example, an-
nual leaders’ dinners and other large fundraising events starring cabinet 
ministers are likely to have provided little or no access for businesses 
that invested in tickets. Real access consists of an often brief, but se-
cret, one-on-one meeting or communication with a decision maker as 
well a real expectation that the pitch will be favorably considered. This 
sort of access is more likely to be provided through a broker such as a 
member of a minister’s staff office, one of the party’s “bagmen,” an mp, 
or a lower-tier politician—all of whom not only realize that the firm 
83 Matas 1995; Ovenden 2000.
84 Yaffe 2002.
85 Mittelstaedt 1993; Alberts 1994.
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is a regular and substantial political contributor, but may well remem-
ber a name and a face and have some understanding of the needs and 
problems of the firm. In other words, through the trust of her broker, 
the decision maker would need to be convinced that she and her party 
are involved in a stable and mutually beneficial reciprocal exchange. 
The centralization of the system meant that substantial fundraising was 
much easier if a cabinet minister was produced.
The parties’ money men knew this and put a lot of energy into insist-
ing that ministers attended fundraising events when on official business 
outside of the capital.86 The really large firms expected that the solicita-
tion of funds would be accompanied by a visit from one of a handful of 
senior fundraisers who were directly answerable to the party leader or 
prime minister and who could set up meetings with ministers.87 Thus, 
businesses calculated that their money could be useful when, and if, 
the need arose. Even so, the contribution did not guarantee anything 
and the process was subject to the uncertainty typical of reciprocity. In 
a sense, Canadian Senator Leo Kolber, a Liberal fundraiser, was abso-
lutely correct when he said that he “did not promise a bloody thing” 
when fundraising from businesses.88 Similarly, New South Wales Pre-
mier Bob Carr said, “They’ll be listened to by government but they’ll 
know they get as many knock backs on policy requests as they get tick-
offs.”89 These statements are consistent with the nature of a reciprocal 
exchange in which no clear terms are set. While nothing may have been 
overtly promised, the politicians omitted mentioning that something 
was expected in the future. Political contributions help develop a rela-
tively diffuse obligation to reciprocate. Often the relationship and the 
money may have achieved nothing other than “the answer to a phone 
call—or a quicker answer to a phone call.”90
Once understood in terms of this wider context, other supposed 
anomalies regarding political donations become less puzzling. Large 
firms—ones that already have access—make payments to develop a 
sense of reciprocal obligation among the political elite beyond the ob-
jective social and economic importance of the enterprise. Many of the 
best-attended and expensive fundraising events provide little or no ac-
cess to the decision maker, but they demonstrate that the political actors 
present may have direct access to the star politician giving the keynote 
86 For Canada, see Matas 1995. For Australia, see Clark and Glendinning 2001; Baker 2006.
87 Stanbury 1993, 315.
88 Stanbury 1993, 315.
89 Hanna 2003.
90 For Canada, see Allen 1989a; Curtis 1999. For Australia, see Birnbauer 2007.
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speech. Firms that are aware of the utility of developing a relationship 
with a party, and especially with well-connected individuals within it, 
see a clear rationale for attending such events. Thus, the donations con-
stitute an investment in a small but real increase in the probability of 
successful lobbying. Since journalists do not have an incentive to muse 
on the subtle reciprocity of the system of party-firm relations, discrete 
exchanges are much more likely to make the headlines. The nature of 
the situation in which Australian and Canadian firms and parties found 
themselves suggests a greater proportion of reciprocal, and a lesser pro-
portion of discrete, exchanges than the newspaper articles suggest.
It is likely that the relative prevalence of the two types of exchanges 
differed in these two pragmatic countries. The simulations do not di-
rectly measure exchange processes, but they can provide some hints. 
Hedging, and especially consistent hedging, should be associated with a 
long-term expectation of reciprocity. Models five and six predict that on 
average just less than one-third of Canadian contributors should hedge, 
but only 14 percent of Australian contributors should do likewise. The 
figures suggest that 13 percent of Canadian contributors should hedge 
consistently, but the Australian probability is less than 0.01 percent. 
Contribution size also provides some evidence of the relative impor-
tance of discrete and reciprocal exchanges. In relation to firm income, 
the mean Australian payment is almost twice the size of its Canadian 
counterpart. As a proportion of party income, the difference is even 
greater: Australian payments are over five times as large. These bigger 
contributions are consistent with a greater frequency of costlier discrete 
exchanges in Australia. Newspaper articles also give the impression that 
discrete exchanges were more common in Australia. In particular, the 
terms of exchange seem to have been more explicit there than in Can-
ada. It was quite common for the Australian parties to auction access 
in the form of a private meal with a minister or premier.91 Australian 
parties still offer a variety of annual packages that extend different, and 
very clearly specified, levels of access to member businesses:
A glossy alp brochure is offering five levels of “business dialogue,” starting at 
$100,000 for a foundation partner and working down to $10,000 for an execu-
tive partner. For a $100,000 donation to alp coffers, a partner would receive 
a private boardroom lunch with senior [New South Wales Premier Morris] 
Iemma government ministers, five places at a federal mps’ dinner, 10 invitations 
to the Premier’s Christmas drinks, a Vip table at the budget dinner and favored 
treatment at alp functions.92
91 Verrender 2001; Clennell 2007a; Gibson and McClymont 2008.
92 Mitchell 2006; Clennell 2007b.
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The nature of the data sets is surely an important explanation for these 
differences. The Australian data contains contributions from seven ju-
risdictions with populations ranging from only half a million in Tas-
mania to twenty-one million for the Australian Commonwealth itself. 
All Canadian data relates to the federal level, and thus to a country 
of thirty-three million. Politicians in larger jurisdictions are subject 
to much greater media scrutiny than those in small jurisdictions and 
therefore risk much greater publicity costs from discrete exchanges. 
Moreover, politicians in larger jurisdictions can raise funds from a 
much larger pool of contributors and are under less pressure to provide 
large and immediate benefits. Finally, the smaller scale of the events 
themselves made it easier to provide real access. For example, almost 
nothing on the scale of Canadian leadership dinners has taken place in 
Australia.93
It is also possible that party systems help explain the different em-
phasis on discrete and reciprocal exchanges. In Canada, both parties 
had long-established relationships with business, and on that basis 
firms could expect reciprocity. By contrast, the Australian Labor Party’s 
drive to raise business funds dated from only a decade before the begin-
ning of the data set.94 The alp could not rely on the slow and subtle 
reciprocity of a traditional business party. It was often tempted to offer 
relatively explicit discrete exchanges of access for cash to secure business 
funding. This may have caused a very special “contagion from the left,” 
which meant the right could no longer take businesses for granted and 
also had to offer them special memberships and seemingly clear access 
opportunities.95 This is of course part of the same process that likely led 
to a shift from ideological to pragmatic giving.
In contrast to the mountain of access-related articles in the Austra-
lian and Canadian press, it is very difficult to find any pieces alleging 
systematic exchanges between contributing businesses and parties in 
Germany. Indeed, there seems to be only one clear example of the sale 
of access during the sample period and afterward. The North Rhine 
Westphalian Christian Democrats sold access to regional Prime Minis-
ter Dr. Jürgen Rüttgers at the party’s annual congress. For €5,000, a firm 
could get a small display stand and a couple of tickets for the evening 
event. Sixteen-thousand euros bought the “Partner Package III,” which 
included the placement of a representative of the firm at one of the top 
Vip tables and the opportunity to meet the prime minister and con-
93 Gordon and Carty 2008.
94 Carney 1994.
95 Hartcher 1992; Hewett 2003; Koutsoukis and Schubert 2004.
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duct a private conversation with him. A public relations firm organized 
the scheme, allegedly without the knowledge of the prime minister; 
the prime minister ultimately fired the secretary-general of the Party. 
The access payments were classed as “sponsorship,” rather than “dona-
tions,” and did not have to be reported. There was a consensus that the 
episode was very unusual. A journalist opined that “[T]he “Rent-a- 
Rüttgers” system went far beyond what is usual with other parties,”96 
while another reported that, “Bundestag President Wolfgang Thierse 
(spd) [could] not remember having heard before of similar cases.”97
conclusions
Business money does talk politics. In pragmatic Australia and Canada, it 
says, softly and subtly, but insistently, that, in reciprocation for small but 
certain financial benefits, contributing businesses expect special con-
sideration of their lobbying efforts. This expectation is relatively firmly 
embedded in a long-established and well-known, if far from predict-
able, system of party-firm relations. Special consideration is delivered 
through personal and organizational relationships that would not have 
existed or would have been of inferior quality had financial contribu-
tions not been made. In Germany, there is no such systematic integra-
tion of political finance and party-firm relations. The small number of 
payments made tend to express the traditional ideological preference 
of German business for right-wing parties and their suspicion of the 
Social Democrats.
 This variation reflects fundamental differences in political economy 
between liberal Australia and Canada and coordinated Germany. Col-
lective representation is embedded in the strategy of German firms and 
complements a whole range of economic, social, and political institu-
tions. Thus, in Germany it is not necessary for firms to pursue their 
interests by using contributions to help develop firm-specific relation-
ships with political parties. In Australia and Canada, firms employ more 
individualistic and straightforward competitive strategies, and, conse-
quently, collective representation tends to be weak. Political contribu-
tions to parties are a way of pursuing business interests in the political 
arena. In Canada, the two centrist parties share a fundamentally pro-
business position, posing very little policy risk to the overall business 
sector. Australian businesses exhibit a mix of pragmatism and ideol-
96 Schmidt and Wyputta 2010.
97 Appenzeller, Funk, Sirleschtov, and Zurheide 2010.
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ogy when financing parties. Historically, the Liberals were the party of 
business and the market and the Australian Labor Party kept its dis-
tance from business while maintaining a good relationship with labor 
unions.98 There is still a bias toward the right in the business financing 
of political parties, but this seems to have diminished due to the alp’s 
conversion to the market in the 1980s.
These differences are likely to have had major consequences. Germa-
ny’s low contribution rate means it is unlikely that businesses have in-
fluenced the outcome of party competition. The logic of pragmatism is 
to reflect, rather than to try to modify, existing distributions of political 
support. In pragmatic Canada, business money tended to treat the prin-
cipal competitors equally but disadvantaged parties seeking to break the 
duopoly of the Liberals and Progressive Conservatives. The Australian 
combination of ideological contributions and a relatively high contribu-
tion rate means that businesses systematically bias Australian politics 
toward the right. Pragmatism should have important effects on pub-
lic policy. While there is no suggestion that, except in very rare cases, 
policy was bought in Australia and Canada, there is a consensus that 
business payments to parties are interested payments. An opportunity 
to make a pitch, or a hearing that is slightly more sympathetic, must 
mean that decisions are frequently affected. In total, these decisions 
should have skewed the system toward private goods and away from 
public goods. Thus, there are good reasons to believe that variations 
in motivation across the three cases have had substantial political and 
economic ramifications.
This pioneering cross-national study of firm behavior in political 
finance owes a debt to a distinguished research program in Ameri-
can politics. As mentioned above, the relatively singular nature of the 
American political system and its highly singular regulation of political 
finance make it a difficult case for comparative analysis in this subject. 
Nonetheless, the American case seems to fit the argument of this ar-
ticle. It is the archetypical liberal market economy99 with a left-right 
divide, albeit not on the basis of disciplined parliamentary parties, and 
executive elections in which winner takes all. Political contributions 
by large firms are common and while pragmatism seems to dominate, 
ideological strategies also exist.100 Moreover, the benefits of pragmatism 
are best described in the subtle terms of reciprocal exchange. To a great 
98 McEachern 1992a; McEachern 1992b.
99 Hall and Soskice 2001, 27–33.
100 Clawson, Neustadtl, and Weller 1998, 139–66.
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extent, indeed, the techniques, technology, and culture of party political 
fundraising have diffused from the U.S. to Canada and Australia.101 A 
once good, but now outdated, reason for the insularity of the Ameri-
can literature was that its transparent disclosure regime was relatively 
unique.102 However, there is now a large number of countries that meet 
the requirements of transparency and permissiveness that allow for use-
ful statistical studies of business contributions to parties. As internal 
variation develops over time, these countries will be available for analy-
sis in the style of this article. Therefore, the arguments presented here 
have the potential for wider comparative testing.
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